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The R&D Anomaly: Risk or Mispricing? 
 
ABSTRACT 
We offer new evidence on the risk versus mispricing explanations for the R&D anomaly. Return 
covariance with a characteristic-based factor captures the cross-sectional return variation on R&D 
portfolios not explained by asset pricing models. This is consistent with both covariance risk and 
mispricing. Under the framework of the ICAPM, we find little economic justification that an R&D factor 
is a proxy for innovations to a state variable. The characteristic subsumes the factor loading in direct tests, 
providing support to the mispricing hypothesis. Investigating the mispricing explanation further, we reject 
the assertion that the R&D anomaly arises from the correction of stocks mispriced by investor sentiment. 
A natural experiment exploiting the pilot program under Regulation SHO shows no evidence that the 
anomaly persists due to limits to arbitrage in the form of short sale constraints.  
 
Keywords: R&D anomaly; Covariance risk; ICAPM; Mispricing. 
 




Research and Development (R&D) is an important driver of innovation, firm value and long-term 
economic growth. R&D investment earns significant positive stock returns that asset pricing models are 
unable to explain. The longevity of the R&D anomaly represents a complex and important challenge to 
asset pricing models. Despite a large literature confirming the anomaly, there is far less consensus on why 
it persists. Some studies attribute it to investor mispricing, while others argue that it reflects a premium to 
compensate systematic risk. We present new evidence on this debate by performing more direct tests to 
distinguish between these competing hypotheses.  
 Mispricing implies that R&D stocks are undervalued, earning higher returns when the mispricing 
corrects. This may be due to limits to arbitrage or many potential psychological traits. In a frictionless and 
efficient market, an arbitrage strategy would eliminate the anomaly. However, frictions make the costs 
and risks of arbitrage prohibitive, leading to persistent mispricing (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Lamont 
and Thaler (2003) argue that one of the most significant limits to arbitrage is short-sale constraints, under 
which, arbitrageurs are unable to engage the short leg of the arbitrage, allowing mispricing to persist. 
Some behavioral explanations are as follows. First, hard to value stocks, of which R&D intensive stocks 
are examples, may be relatively more sensitive to speculative investment flows subject to investor 
sentiment. According to Baker and Wugler (2006), following high (low) sentiment states, R&D stocks are 
overvalued (undervalued) by sentiment driven speculative demand, which subsequently correct when the 
sentiment reverses. Second, investors have limited attention (Barber and Odean, 2008). Since R&D 
projects are long-term whilst investors’ horizons are short-term, investors with limited attention may fail 
to incorporate the longer-term benefits of R&D into current financial information, causing R&D-intensive 
stocks to be undervalued. When the benefits are subsequently realized, the mispricing is corrected 
delivering strong returns. Third, mispricing may arise due to investor over-optimism or over-pessimism, 
founded on their erroneous extrapolation of recent firm performance (Lakonishok et al., 1994). Investors 
are misled by the conservative accounting treatment of R&D, which understates earnings when R&D 
expenditure is increased. Since R&D intensive firms appear less profitable, investors are over-pessimistic 
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of the firm’s prospects. Fourth, investors overreact or underreact to information according to 
representativeness and conservatism heuristics (Barberis et al, 1998). For R&D, conservatism suggests 
that investors are slow to update their analysis of the benefit of R&D investment, the corresponding 
underreaction in stock prices then correct as investors update. Finally, investors react differently to 
tangible and intangible information (Daniel and Titman, 2006). Intangible returns, the proportion of stock 
returns not arising from accounting information, predict future stock returns negatively. This implies that 
the R&D anomaly may be driven not by R&D information, but lower prior intangible returns. 
A convincing systematic risk explanation for the R&D anomaly requires theoretical motivation, 
which originates from the dynamic, multistage, real option model of Berk et al. (2004). The key property 
of the model is that the option-like characteristics of R&D ventures magnifies their systematic risk so they 
command a higher premium compared to standard cash generating projects. At each stage of 
development, the firm decides whether to continue to invest in R&D or to suspend the project. This 
decision rests on whether the expected cash flows from completion meet an appropriate threshold. The 
uncertainty of the potential cash flows from the project and their sensitivity to the stochastic discount 
factor generate the systematic risk of R&D. 
Berk et al. (2004) derive the dynamics of the risk premium. Specifically, the premium falls 
between lower and upper bounds. On completion, R&D is analogous to a conventional project generating 
stochastic cash flows and so earns the premium at the lower bound, which is equivalent to that of non-
R&D firms. Prior to completion, the premium on R&D increases above this lower bound reflecting the 
option to suspend. The more likely is suspension of the venture, the higher is the systematic risk 
embedded in R&D options and the greater the premium on R&D. 
Resolution of the risk versus mispricing debate relies on rigorous empirical testing. Much of the 
existing evidence is based on inference from indirect tests or is implied by the elimination of one side of 
the argument. The risk-based explanation requires a proxy for a latent state variable, the innovations to 
which should capture the dispersion of returns in the cross section. This is a necessary condition, but is 
not sufficient for two important reasons. First, the ad hoc addition of variables to multifactor models does 
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not guarantee the resulting factor structure will capture the economic risk associated with the anomaly 
(Hirschelifer et al., 2012; Maio and Santa-Clara, 2012). Therefore, adding a new factor based on R&D 
should be supported by an economic justification. Second, latent state variables are often proxied by firm 
characteristics. The innovations to the state variable are then captured by returns to portfolios sorted by 
the characteristic (Fama and French, 1993, 2015; Carhart, 1997). Adding such variables to multifactor 
models can appear to work well in modelling covariance and eliminating the anomaly. But, since the 
return-based factor correlates highly with the characteristic by construction, there is no way to reject 
characteristic mispricing with confidence (Hirschleifer et al, 2012).     
Our first contribution to the literature performs more direct tests on the R&D anomaly that 
resolve these two issues. We follow the empirical asset pricing literature to create an R&D factor based 
on the anomaly, which seems to perform well. We then test whether this factor meets the strict conditions 
of the Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) (Merton, 1973), which is a necessary condition to support a risk 
explanation. Specifically, candidate factors should predict future investment opportunities, factor loadings 
should be priced in the cross section with the appropriate sign and must ensure an economically plausible 
equity market risk premium in a multifactor model (Maio and Santa-Clara, 2012). We are unable to 
support the economic motivation for the R&D factor as an ICAPM state variable. Second, we adopt the 
methodology of Daniel and Titman (1997) to distinguish risk versus mispricing directly. A covariance 
risk explanation requires that future return patterns from characteristic balanced portfolios are predicted 
by preformation factor loadings. Triple sorting stocks by their size, R&D and preformation R&D factor 
loadings, we find that the R&D factor loading does not predict future returns. Next, we use these 
portfolios in cross sectional regressions that include both the covariance and characteristic as regressors.  
The covariance is subsumed by the characteristic. This evidence rejects the factor risk pricing explanation 
for the R&D anomaly in favor of mispricing. 
 Our second contribution to the literature investigates the mispricing explanation in greater depth. 
We begin by examining the effect of investor sentiment on the R&D anomaly. Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
argue that shifts in investor sentiment have cross-sectional effects on returns that reveal the correction of 
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mispricing. Certain stocks that are hard-to-value and more costly to arbitrage, such as R&D intensive 
stocks, may be subject to larger mispricing in relation to the degree of R&D investment. Overvaluation 
during high sentiment states and undervaluation during low sentiment states should correct as investor 
sentiment shifts to the opposite state. Contrary to this prediction, we find that sentiment has no effect on 
R&D portfolios. Specifically, we find no evidence for the correction of overvaluation, but show the 
correction of undervaluation following both sentiment states. Controlling for factor risk using the Carhart 
(1997) and Fama and French (2015) models, we document stronger evidence to refute investor sentiment 
as the explanation for R&D mispricing.  
Next, we examine whether limits to arbitrage affect the R&D anomaly. In an efficient market, 
mispricing is arbitraged away quickly. However, market frictions could make the costs and risks of 
arbitrage prohibitive, providing the conditions for mispricing to persist (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). One 
of the most important limits to arbitrage is short-sale constraints (Lamont and Thaler, 2003). However, 
identifying the effects of short-sale constraints on stock prices is difficult because existing proxies are 
imperfect and are likely to correlate with pricing factors and firm characteristics that drive returns. To 
circumvent these challenges, we exploit the plausibly exogenous variations in short-sale restrictions 
provided by the pilot program under Regulation SHO and estimate a difference-in-differences model for 
identification. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a pilot program under 
Regulation SHO to study how short-sale price tests affect the stock market and designated a random 
sample of stocks from the Russell 3000 index as pilot stocks. The pilot stocks were exempt from short-
sale restrictions over the period from June 2005 to July 2007 and were therefore easier to short sell. Our 
difference-in-differences analysis compares the high-minus-low R&D return spread between pilot and 
non-pilot stocks, before and after the implementation of the pilot program. We decompose the long and 
short legs of the anomaly to isolate the effect of lifting short sale constraints. The short leg shows no 
effect from the pilot so we find no evidence that short sale constraints contribute to R&D mispricing.  
 There is a long history documenting significant positive returns related to R&D expenditure 
(Chan et al., 1990), capital (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996), intensity (Chan et al., 2001) and growth (Penman 
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and Zhang, 2002; Eberhart et al., 2004; Lev et al., 2005). Meanwhile, the literature has inferred potential 
explanations for its persistence. In support of behavioral mispricing, investors fail to value the benefits of 
long term R&D investment due to limited attention (Hall, 1993; Lev et al., 2005), are pessimistic on R&D 
intensive stocks that have poor past performance (Chan et al., 2001), underreact to the conservative 
reporting of R&D (Penman and Zhang, 2002) and underreact to the benefits of R&D increases (Eberhart 
et al., 2004). On the other hand, R&D fully or partially subsumes the book-to-market effect, R&D returns 
are not explained by the Fama and French (1993) model, an R&D factor contributes to explaining the 
cross sectional variation in R&D returns and R&D returns show some state dependence (Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1999; Al-Horani et al., 2003), which are interpreted as consistent with the risk explanation. 
 Chambers et al. (2002) seek to distinguish between the competing hypotheses. They show that 
excess R&D returns are not removed by Fama and French (1993) risk controls, they persist for up to ten 
years, and are related to dispersion in analyst forecast and post-investment earnings, all of which are 
consistent with the notion that risk is not adequately controlled for in R&D intensive stocks. However, 
they fail to rule out entirely the mispricing arising from investor underreaction to the conservative 
accounting treatment of R&D. The remaining literature delves deeper into the information contained in 
R&D expenditure. Li (2011) and Gu (2016) reinforce the risk hypothesis that abnormal R&D returns stem 
from the real options within R&D projects. They argue that the systematic risk arising from the inherent 
leverage in the options to suspend or abandon reveals itself when interacting R&D with financial 
constraints (Li, 2011) and product market competition (Gu, 2016). R&D intensive stocks earn higher 
future returns in relation to these other characteristics.  
In contrast, Cohen et al. (2013) show that R&D intensive firms that have completed projects 
successfully in the past earn significantly higher future returns than firms that have been less productive 
for the same R&D intensity. Rather than R&D itself, it is the information relating to the predictability of 
its likely success that attention limited investors consistently underreact to. Hirshleifer et al. (2013) also 
investigate innovation success, but in the form of the efficiency of R&D, measured as the number of 
patents and their citations in proportion to R&D investment. Following the same reasoning, investors are 
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unable to decipher the predictive information in innovation efficiency between R&D intensive firms. 
Therefore, innovation efficient firms are relatively undervalued and earn high future returns.  
To further complicate matters, Donelson and Resutek (2012) suggest that R&D is neither 
mispriced nor impacts systematic risk directly. Extending the methodology of Daniel and Titman (2006), 
they decompose returns into R&D and non-R&D components that are orthogonal to each other. The R&D 
component captures the level of R&D and its growth, thereby capturing the information investors see in 
R&D expenditure, but this characteristic does not determine returns, which refutes the mispricing 
explanation. Rather, the non-R&D component that encompasses all other value relevant information 
forecasts future returns, but with a negative sign. Analogous to Daniel and Titman (2006), Donelson and 
Resutek (2012) interpret abnormal R&D returns as emanating not from information in R&D, but from 
intangible information unrelated to R&D, but present in R&D firms. This non-R&D component of returns 
maps onto variables that relate to the value anomaly. 
We contribute to this ongoing risk versus mispricing debate in several ways. First, we extend the 
literature that relies on asset pricing factors by subjecting the data to more stringent tests. We construct an 
R&D factor based on the anomalous returns, but we seek an economic motivation for it under the 
restrictive conditions of the ICAPM (Maio and Santa-Clara, 2012). Next, we test covariance versus the 
characteristic directly by triple sorting stocks into portfolios, analyzing characteristic balanced portfolios 
and examining predictive Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions at the portfolio and individual stock 
levels (Daniel and Titman, 1997; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). We find little evidence to support the 
systematic risk argument. The R&D factor returns do not meet the criteria demanded by the ICAPM, the 
R&D factor loadings do not predict future returns after controlling for the characteristic, and this 
covariance is subsumed by the characteristic.  
In light of this, we extend the literature that already asserts the mispricing hypothesis (Cohen et 
al., 2013; Hirshleifer et al., 2013) by investigating two further issues. We follow Baker and Wugler 
(2006) to assess the role of investor sentiment on the correction of the mispricing of R&D stocks. We find 
no effect. Finally, we perform a difference-in-differences analysis to test whether the lifting of short sale 
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constraints on a random selection of stocks under the SEC’s Regulation SHO pilot scheme allowed 
investors to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity implied by the R&D anomaly. We find no 
evidence that the pilot corrected any mispricing due to short sale constraints. Our findings, therefore, 
suggest that it is the characteristic that drives the R&D anomaly.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 confirms the R&D anomaly. 
Section 3 establishes an R&D factor that proxies for innovations to a state variable. Section 4 seeks a 
fundamental economic justification for the R&D factor in the form of an ICAPM state variable. Section 5 
tests the predictive power of the R&D factor loading against the R&D characteristic in a direct evaluation 
of the characteristic versus covariance hypothesis. Section 6 presents evidence on the impacts of investor 
sentiment and limits to arbitrage on the R&D anomaly and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The R&D Anomaly 
Our first task is to confirm that the R&D anomaly is a persistent feature of stock returns that cannot be 
explained by existing asset pricing factors. We construct a sample consisting of all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks with accounting data available from COMPUSTAT and securities data from the Centre 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from July 1975 to June 2013. Stocks with a share code of 10 or 11 
are included. All accounting variables as at fiscal year-end in calendar year t-1 are matched with monthly 
returns from July t to June t+1, allowing sufficient time for public information to be made available to 
investors. Any unmerged data and firm-month observations with negative book values of equity are 
discarded and financial stocks are excluded. We adjust returns for stock delisting to avoid survivorship 
bias following Shumway (1997). 1  Our final sample consists of 1,945,179 stock-month observations 
(17,694 firms), with 774,072 stock-month observations (7,788 firms) having non-zero R&D expenditure. 
Consistent with the literature, we measure R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D expenditure to 
market value (RD-MV) and this is for several reasons. First, prior studies show that RD-MV is associated 
                                                     
1 When a stock delists, the last return is the delisting return if it is available. Following Shumway (1997), if this is 
not available, we assign a return of -30 percent for stocks that delist for performance reasons and -100 percent for 
those that delist for other reasons. 
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with greater anomalous returns than alternative measures such as R&D expenses to total assets (RD-A) or 
total sales (RD-S) (Chan et al., 2001; Al-Horani et al., 2003). Second, RD-MV is analogous to price 
multiples and can therefore be readily applied to practical investment analysis. Third, RD-MV is not as 
volatile across time and sectors as RD-S, is not as persistent as RD-A, and is less likely to be influenced by 
creative accounting.2  
 To test for the R&D anomaly, we assign stocks with non-zero R&D expenditure into 2×5=10 
portfolios according to market capitalization (Size) as at December of year t-1 and RD-MV using 
independent sorts. We then compute their equal and value-weighted average returns in excess of the 1-
month Treasury bill rate to compare the effects of weighting method. To reduce the dispersion in size 
across R&D ranks, we average (equal weights) the R&D portfolio returns across the size portfolios to 
produce R&D quintiles and report these in Table 1. The average firm characteristics for these portfolios 
can be found in Table IA.1 of the online appendix. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Panel A in Table 1 shows a monotonic increase of equally weighted average returns with RD-MV. 
The spread between the 1.67 percent return for Portfolio 5 and 0.43 percent return for Portfolio 1 
represents a statistically and economically significant return on the zero-cost portfolio (5-1) of 1.24 
percent per month. The anomaly persists in estimated alphas when adjusting for the conventional Carhart 
(1997) (C-4) and Fama and French (2015) (FF-5) factors. The zero-cost spread portfolio yields a C-4 
alpha of 1.09 percent and a FF-5 alpha of 1.18 percent per month, both significant at the 1 percent level. 
In Panel B we report value-weighted returns and again find that average excess returns, and C-4 and FF-5 
alphas increase monotonically with RD-MV. Although smaller than in Panel A, the 5-1 portfolio return, 
                                                     
2 We perform a range of robustness checks on our empirical analysis in sections 2, 3 and 5. These include RD-A, 
RD-S and RDC-MV measures. Following Chan et al. (2001), we measure the stock of R&D capital using the 
perpetual inventory method as follows: , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.2i t i t i t i t i t i tRDC RD RD RD RD RD            . We also exclude 
R&D stocks with prices smaller than $1 and larger than $1000, or with prices smaller than $5 and larger than $1000, 
at the portfolio formation. Finally, the RD-HML factor is robust to variations in the methods of its construction 
including adjustments for size, size and book-to-market, Daniel et al. (1997) characteristics matching, independent 
and dependent portfolio sorting, value weighting and the use of alternative breakpoints. All our results are robust. 
This analysis is not reported, but is available on request. 
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C-4 alpha and FF-5 alpha all remain significant at the 1% level with value-weighted average excess 
returns of 0.81 percent, 0.56 percent and 0.62 percent per month respectively. 
We check the patterns of loadings on the factors across R&D quintiles, but do not report the 
results for brevity. The loadings on SMB and CMA increase with RD-MV, while those on HML5 and 
RMW decrease. Under the FF-5 model, the zero-cost spread portfolio loads significantly on all factors 
except for HML5. These patterns suggest that R&D-intensive stocks display at least some similar 
covariance structure to small, growth, weak operating profitability and conservative investment firms.3 
We confirm the presence of the R&D anomaly and show that it cannot be explained by popular 
empirical asset pricing factors, including the relatively newer investment and profitability factors.4 We 
proceed to test whether this R&D anomaly represents mispricing or a factor risk premium. 
 
3. Constructing an R&D Factor (RD-HML) 
We begin by extracting an empirical factor from the R&D anomaly by forming a factor-mimicking 
portfolio based on the anomaly itself. This follows the well-known empirical asset pricing literature that 
replicates a state variable that is highly correlated with the anomaly. Stocks that are most exposed to the 
anomaly load more heavily onto this factor, and this occurs even when the latent risk factor is 
unobserved.5  
At the end of June of year t, we sort R&D stocks independently into 2×3=6 portfolios according 
to Size (median breakpoint) and RD-MV (breakpoints at the 30th and 70th percentiles) and compute their 
value weighted average returns. The R&D factor, which we denote RD-HML, is computed as the high 
minus low RD-MV returns. To adjust for Size, the high and low RD-MV portfolios are equally weighted 
across the two Size groups. More formally, RD-HML = (S/H + B/H)/2 ‒ (S/L + B/L)/2. The summary 
                                                     
3 The unabridged version of these estimation results can be found in Table IA.2 of the online appendix. 
4 Our results are comparable to those of Hou et al. (2015).  Furthermore, greater abnormal returns for equal than 
value weighting tests are entirely consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2000) who argue that the former does not 
obscure mispricing that is likely greater among smaller firms. This is pertinent to our study because R&D-intensive 
stocks tend to be smaller in size.  
5 See Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012). 
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statistics, pairwise correlations and factor spanning tests of the RD-HML factor on the Carhart (1997) and 
Fama and French (2015) factors are reported in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Panel A reports summary statistics for our pricing factors. The R&D factor yields an average 
premium of 0.68 percent per month, which is the highest among all the factors and double those of the 
FF-5 model. This high return relative to the standard deviation of 3.59 delivers an ex-post Sharpe ratio of 
0.19, which is also the largest of all the factors. These simple statistics demonstrate the importance of the 
R&D anomaly. Panel B shows generally moderate pairwise correlations between RD-HML and the other 
factors. Only Size (SMB3 and SMB5) and RMW show meaningful correlations of 0.58, 0.56 and -0.55 
respectively. These are consistent with the estimated factor loadings in Table IA.2 (in the online 
appendix), which suggest that R&D portfolio returns are related to these existing factors. 6  More 
importantly, Panel C examines the covariance structure of factor returns. The factor spanning tests regress 
RD-HML on other risk factors based on the CAPM, FF-3, C-4, and FF-5 models. We find that regardless 
of the model specifications, the intercepts are positive and significant, and the adjusted R-squared of the 
models are quite low (36.8 percent for FF-3, 37.2 percent for C-4 and 47.5 percent for FF-5 respectively). 
These indicate that the R&D anomaly generates significant abnormal returns and considerable return 
variation beyond those predicted by established factors.7 
Our results show that the RD-HML portfolio is capturing some incremental covariance structure 
arising from the R&D anomaly and improves the pricing of these stocks. Intuitively, this supports the 
systematic risk explanation of Berk et al. (2004). If firms with higher (lower) R&D intensity share 
characteristics that make them more (less) sensitive to stochastic future cash flows, then we expect their 
                                                     
6 The high correlation of RD-HML with the size factor is in line with Al-Horani et al. (2003) who document a 
correlation coefficient of 0.49 between their R&D factor and the size factor. 
7 A complementary test augments these traditional models with the RD-HML factor, which we include in Table IA.3 
in the online appendix for completeness. Analyzing the value-weighted portfolio returns, we find intercepts 
indistinguishable from zero and monotonically increasing factor loadings of R&D portfolio returns on the RD-HML 
factor that are expected by construction. By adding the RD-HML factor, the loadings of R&D portfolio returns on 
other factors maintain their significance, but any patterns across the quintiles are no longer present. 
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returns to demonstrate higher (lower) co-movement with the level of R&D intensity. However, co-
movement alone meets only the necessary condition for a factor risk explanation for the anomaly. Since 
the factor correlates with the characteristic by construction, this evidence of covariation on its own does 
not allow us to attribute the R&D anomaly to risk as opposed to mispricing. To distinguish between the 
underlying explanations, we perform more stringent tests.   
 
4. Is the RD-HML Factor Consistent with the ICAPM? 
Many multifactor asset pricing models are motivated by the Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) (Merton, 
1973). In addition to the market portfolio, new state variables such as R&D can be identified if their 
factor loadings help to explain the patterns of cross sectional portfolio returns, as demonstrated in the 
previous section. However, adding candidate risk factors can be rather ad hoc if we ignore the theoretical 
restrictions that the ICAPM implies (Maio and Santa-Clara, 2012). Furthermore, constructing the R&D 
factor from the R&D characteristic itself can lead us to mistakenly interpret R&D as a risk factor when it 
is really a proxy for mispricing (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Under the motivation of ICAPM, therefore, a 
sufficient condition to support the risk explanation requires the RD-HML factor to adhere to its 
restrictions.  
Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) identify the three requirements for a potential state variable. First, it 
should forecast changes in the investment opportunity set and thus should forecast future aggregate 
market returns (and variance).  Second, innovations to the state variable should be priced in the cross 
section with the correct sign. Third, the estimate of the market risk premium must be economically 
plausible.   
 To test whether RD-HML meets the first restriction, we follow Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) and 
proxy the investment opportunity set using the aggregate equity market, captured by the monthly return 
on the CRSP value-weighted index. We perform predictive regressions across several horizons to analyze 
whether the R&D state variable has significant forecasting power over future expected market returns. 
Specifically, we estimate the following time-series regressions: 
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Rt,t+q = aq + bq Z
R&D
t + ut,t+q        (1) 
where Rt,t+q = Rt+1 + … + Rt+q  is the continuously compounded market index return over q periods, Z
R&D
t is 
the current value of the R&D related state variable and ut,t+q is the error term. We analyze forecasting 
horizons of 1, 3, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months ahead. The sample runs from July 1975 to June 2013 (456 
months), but q observations are lost for each q-month ahead predictive regression. We evaluate statistical 
significance based on Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors with q lags. If the R&D state 
variable (ZR&Dt) is consistent with the ICAPM, we should find a positive and significant estimates of bq.  
 The R&D state variable warrants explanation. We follow Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) and 
construct an empirical proxy for the state variable, which is analogous to their M/B ratios, but with an 
adjustment for R&D investment. Specifically, we sort stocks independently into 2×3=6 portfolios by Size 
and RD-MV and compute the market capitalization to book equity plus R&D expenses ratio for each 
portfolio and denote this TMV-TBVRD. To adjust for the size effect, we average the ratio across the size 
portfolios for the top and bottom R&D portfolios. RD-HML* then represents the state variable measured 
as the size-adjusted TMV-TBVRD for high R&D stocks minus that for low R&D stocks. We find that RD-
HML ≈ ∆RD-HML*, meaning that our measure is a reasonable proxy for the state variable and the return 
captured by RD-HML is a good approximation for its innovations.8   
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the univariate predictive regressions for RD-HML*, 
which forecasts future market returns positively and significantly and its predictive power increases with 
the horizon q. The R&D state variable satisfies the first requirement of the ICAPM. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
                                                     
8 We experiment with alternative proxies for the state variable as suggested by the referee. These include the sum of 
RD-HML in rolling windows, and the high minus low spreads in RD-MV, MV-RD and MV-BV in Size portfolios, 
which are then averaged across the Size groups. We opt for our measure since it delivers stronger predictability of 
future market returns. It also provides a closer approximation of RD-HML ≈ ∆RD-HML* than the alternatives, 
which is important since it is the RD-HML return that is used later in cross sectional pricing tests. Results based on 
these alternative proxies can be found in Table IA.4 of the online appendix. 
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For robustness, we estimate multivariate predictive regressions that also control for the size, 
value, and momentum state variable proxies in R&D augmented versions of the FF-3 and C-4 models.9 
As shown in Table 4, while the predictive power of RD-HML* is generally reduced after controlling for 
these additional state-variable proxies, it is significant for forecasting positive future aggregate market 
returns from q=12 onward. Consistent with Maio and Santa-Clara (2012), SMB* does not predict future 
market returns in multivariate regressions while CUMD forecasts them positively. Conditional on RD-
HML* and in our smaller sample of R&D stocks, HML* loses its forecasting power.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
The second requirement for ICAPM consistency is that the R&D factor loadings are priced in the 
cross section with the correct sign. To test this, we follow Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) and use 25 Size-
BM, 25 Size-Momentum and 25 Size-RD-MV portfolios as test assets. We use a 60-month rolling window 
to estimate the loadings of each portfolio on the factors. We then examine whether the estimated loadings 
are correctly priced in the cross-section of subsequent excess returns using Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
cross-sectional regressions with Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard errors. Table 5 reports these 
pricing results. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Panels A and B show results based on the Size-BM and Size-Momentum portfolios respectively, to 
test risk pricing in the full cross section. In Panel A, the risk prices of SMB, HML and UMD are positive, 
but only significant for HML. Adding RD-HML loadings produces only minor changes to the results; the 
significance of HML increases and the risk price on UMD decreases. However, although not significant, 
the price of risk on RD-HML is negative. For portfolios sorted by size and momentum in Panel B, SMB 
retains positive yet insignificant coefficients. However, HML conveys a negative and insignificant price 
of risk, while that on momentum is positive and significant, as expected given the test assets. More 
notably, the price of R&D risk is positive, and significantly so in the C-4 model, which is encouraging for 
                                                     
9 We focus on these factor models because Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) show that they perform best in their 
candidate models in consistently satisfying the ICAPM conditions.  
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a risk explanation for the R&D anomaly. To check the robustness of this result to errors-in-variables 
problems, we perform two-pass tests that estimate factor loadings for the full sample in the first stage and 
one cross-sectional regression in the second stage with Shanken (1992) corrected standard errors 
(reported in Table IA.5). The significant price of R&D risk is robust.10 In Panel C, no factor is priced 
other than R&D. Moreover, throughout Table 5, the intercepts are significant implying inadequate pricing 
performance. 
The final ICAPM restriction requires the price of market risk to be economically plausible. We 
find that these estimates are negative in all columns and are statistically significant in some cases. When 
applying the Shanken (1992) methodology, the coefficients are positive in only 5 out of 12 estimations, 
but these are never significant. This important finding means that these models are inconsistent with the 
ICAPM, meaning that we fail to support a fundamental economic justification for the R&D factor, which 
is not consistent with a rational risk pricing explanation for the R&D anomaly.  
 
5. Covariance vs. Characteristics 
As argued by Berk et al. (2004), the leverage embedded in the real options of R&D projects make R&D 
firms more sensitive to common risk factor(s) affecting the likelihood of future cashflows to the projects, 
such that they earn positive systematic risk premia. Alternatively, R&D stocks may be mispriced because 
of limits to arbitrage or psychological biases. The RD-HML factor constructed in section 3 captures the 
abnormal return to R&D intensive stocks, but this premium could just as well be driven by mispricing as 
covariance risk. The evidence in section 4 fails to support a risk factor explanation under the framework 
of ICAPM. 
Daniel and Titman (1997) accept that it would be very difficult for characteristics-based 
portfolios to satisfy the conditions required for consistency with ICAPM. Therefore, in this section, we 
are less focused on whether the R&D factor meets these strict conditions, but are more concerned with the 
                                                     
10 Indeed, this alternative method shows other changes that suggest more promising pricing performance. For Size-
BM portfolios, the UMD factor shows a significant positive price of risk.  Analogously, for Size-Momentum 
portfolios, HML has a positive and significant price of risk. 
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more fundamental issue of whether the R&D anomaly is related to a factor loading at all. We employ the 
methodology of Daniel and Titman (1997), which investigates the ability of factor loadings to explain the 
cross sectional patterns in average portfolio returns after controlling for the characteristic that determines 
the anomaly. This allows us to distinguish between the risk and mispricing explanations for the R&D 
anomaly directly.  
 We begin by performing a triple sort of stocks into portfolios by Size, RD-MV, and pre-formation 
loadings on the RD-HML factor (Pre-βRD-HML). We estimate a stock’s Pre-βRD-HML by regressing stock 
returns on RD-HML during months t-60 to t-7 relative to the portfolio formation date (the end of June 
every year). These pre-formation R&D factor loadings instrument for future expected loadings. At the end 
of June each year, we sort stocks independently into 3×3=9 portfolios by Size and RD-MV (breakpoints at 
30th and 70th percentiles). Within each of the nine portfolios, we sort further into three portfolios 
according to the pre-formation R&D factor loadings (breakpoints at the 30th and 70th percentiles) to create 
27 portfolios. For each of the 27 portfolios, we calculate the equal and value-weighted excess portfolio 
returns, Size, RD-MV and Pre-βRD-HML. We then regress the portfolio returns on the augmented C-4 model, 
which includes the RD-HML factor, to estimate the portfolio alpha and post-formation R&D factor 
loadings (βRD-HML). Panel A of Table 6 presents these statistics. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 In each Size-RD-MV group (blocks of three rows in Panel A), we achieve the objective of the 
triple sorting, which is to produce variation in the factor loading (beta) whilst keeping the Size and RD-
MV characteristics balanced. After controlling for the RD-MV characteristic, a risk explanation for the 
R&D anomaly should show a positive relation between pre-formation factor loadings and portfolio 
returns. Our results do not support this conjecture. For equally weighted portfolio returns, only the S/M 
Size-RD-MV group displays returns increasing with Pre-βRD-HML. One group (B/M) shows the reverse, 
returns falling with higher loadings. Of the seven remaining categories, six show a humped pattern where 
returns increase from low to medium loadings, but see returns to high loadings diminish. The higher R&D 
loading portfolios struggle to earn a sufficient return to provide clear support to the risk explanation. 
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More importantly, in five of these six cases, the fall off produces a return to high Pre-βRD-HML portfolios 
that is lower than or very close to the return to low Pre-βRD-HML portfolios, meaning there is no premium 
for R&D covariance risk. The S/H group reveals a dipped pattern, returns falling from small to medium 
R&D loading and then increasing on the highest loading portfolio to earn a premium. 
 The value weighted returns confirm this lack of evidence for covariance risk driving the R&D 
anomaly. Again, only one Size-RD-MV category shows the increasing returns-loadings relation (B/H), 
although the difference in return between high and low R&D loading portfolios is small in this case. Two 
categories (M/L and M/M) reveal a decreasing pattern with Pre-βRD-HML. The remaining six groups show a 
humped or dipped pattern, with only three of these showing a positive spread between high and low Pre-
βRD-HML. When controlling for the R&D characteristic, the returns to high R&D factor loading portfolios 
do not earn sufficient returns to suggest that the R&D anomaly is explained by covariance risk. 
 The alphas from the augmented C-4 model are also illuminating. As noted by Hirshleifer et al. 
(2012), they should be zero if the patterns in returns across Pre-βRD-HML are explained by the factor model. 
For equally weighted returns, 14 out of 27 portfolios produce significant estimates of α at the 10% (11 at 
the 5% level). Similarly, 8 (5) out of 27 alphas are significant at the 10% (5%) level for value weighted 
returns. Irrespective of statistical significance, the absolute values of the alphas also tend to be quite large. 
These do not offer convincing support for the risk explanation. More important are the patterns that 
emerge in the α estimates for high and low Pre-βRD-HML portfolios, which manifest in the signs on the α’s. 
Concentrating on the value weighted returns, the average estimated alphas of the nine high R&D loadings 
is -19.11 basis points per month, with 5 out of 9 estimates less than zero. In contrast, 8 out of 9 alphas for 
the low R&D loadings portfolios are positive with an average of 14.33 basis points per month. These 
findings are more suggestive of mispricing. A negative α on a high Pre-βRD-HML portfolio suggests the 
portfolio’s return is insufficient relative to the factor model. Analogously, mispricing suggests higher 
abnormal returns on the low Pre-βRD-HML portfolio, as shown by a positive alpha (Hirshleifer et al. 2012).  
 Rather than relying on detecting patterns in Panel A, we test the risk versus mispricing 
hypotheses more formally by using the 27 triple-sorted portfolios to construct characteristics balanced 
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portfolios. Within each of the nine Size-RD-MV groups, we calculate the return spread between the high 
and low Pre-βRD-HML portfolios, which isolates the premium on the R&D loading after controlling for 
characteristics. We also combine the nine characteristic balanced portfolios with equal weight into one 
portfolio to improve the power of the tests. Panel B of Table 6 reports the average returns and the 
estimated augmented C-4 alphas. The average returns are negative for 9 of the 18 characteristic balanced 
portfolios, and for the combined portfolio in the final row. All portfolio returns are indistinguishable from 
zero. Therefore, when holding the R&D characteristic constant, the R&D factor loading fails to deliver a 
premium, which rejects the rational factor pricing model. Under a covariance risk explanation for the 
R&D anomaly, the estimated alphas should be zero. Alternatively, a mispricing explanation dictates that 
characteristic balanced portfolio returns are not driven by Pre-βRD-HML resulting in negative estimates of α. 
For the more relevant value weighted returns, all estimated intercepts are negative, though not often 
significant. More importantly, under value weighting, we find that the intercept on the combined portfolio 
is negative and significant, which is consistent with the mispricing hypothesis. Since all value weighted 
characteristic balanced portfolios deliver significant post-formation loadings on the R&D factor (βRD-HML), 
our failure to reject the mispricing explanation is not likely due to a lack of statistical power (Hirshleifer 
et al., 2012).11 
A more direct evaluation of the competing risk versus mispricing explanations for the R&D 
anomaly employs monthly Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross sectional tests, both at the portfolio and firm 
                                                     
11 For robustness, we apply the FF-5 model augmented with the R&D factor. We report the results in Table IA.6 of 
the online appendix. The alphas are generally small and insignificant, and are not often negative. With the exception 
of the S/H and B/L portfolios in Panel A, the augmented FF-5 model seems to explain the returns on triple sorted 
portfolios and the characteristic balanced portfolios in Panel B. However, this is not to say that the model supports a 
risk explanation for the R&D anomaly since Pre-βRD-HML failed to provide the necessary premium to explain. 
Another possibility is that the alphas may be the manifestation of overfitting. More curiously, the post-formation 
βRD-HML do not always observe the patterns that we expect. For example, in Panel A for value weighted returns, the 
S/L and M/L blocks show that the βRD-HML from the highest Pre-βRD-HML are lower than the βRD-HML from the medium 
Pre-βRD-HML. In these cases, the preformation loadings do not deliver the necessary post-formation loadings. 
Furthermore, in Panel B and for value weighted returns, the post-formation βRD-HML are declining with the R&D 
characteristic for the portfolios of the smallest and biggest firms. This is contrary to the equal weighted returns, 
Table 6 and the findings of Daniel and Titman (1997) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012). Since the preformation loadings 
are estimated univariately, the failure of the augmented FF-5 model to deliver appropriate post-formation loadings 
could signal some inter-relation between RD-HML and the other factors. This is perhaps not surprising given the 
correlations and factor spanning tests in Table 2. 
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levels. The test assets for the portfolio tests are the excess returns to the 27 characteristic balanced 
portfolios described above. The regressors are the average RD-MV for each portfolio (characteristic) and 
the factor loadings (covariance) estimated for each portfolio on the factors of the C-4 and FF-5 models. 
The factor loadings (βi) are obtained using univariate time series regressions in 60-month rolling windows 
following Jagannathan and Wang (1996).12,13 We report the time-series average of coefficients estimates 
along with their Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics in Panel A of Table 7. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 In columns (1) and (5) βRD-HML explains the cross section of average returns with a positive and 
significant price of risk. This is not inconsistent with the risk explanation since this appears to suggest a 
risk premium for bearing systematic factor risk. However, given the correlation between RD-HML and the 
R&D characteristic, we are unable to rule out mispricing with this test alone. When replacing βRD-HML with 
Avg. RD-MV (the R&D characteristic) in columns (2) and (6), we find the same qualitative result. The 
characteristic also explains the cross section of average returns. Combining both the covariance and 
characteristic into the regressions, we perform the important direct test of the competing hypotheses. We 
show in columns (3) and (7) that the RD-MV characteristic maintains its significance and subsumes the 
explanatory power of the R&D factor loading. This result is maintained in the FF-5 model in columns (4) 
and (8). Therefore, at the portfolio level, we reject the covariance risk hypothesis in favor of the 
mispricing explanation. 
 We adopt a similar approach in Panel B of Table 7, but use individual stock returns instead. This 
allows us to include a wider range of firm-level characteristics that explain cross sectional returns as 
control variables. However, firm level regressions also raise the errors-in-variables problem for the 
                                                     
12 As discussed in Jagannathan and Wang (1998) and Eiling (2013), in a model with multivariate beta, adding a new 
factor will affect the values of all the other betas unless the new factor is uncorrelated with the existing ones. This 
makes the evaluation of adding a new factor on the model’s performance difficult, which complicates model 
selection based on estimated factor risk premia. They argue that the use of univariate beta is more convenient and 
allows for a comparison of model performance. Additionally, since the matrix of univariate betas is a linear 
transformation of the matrix of multivariate betas, the errors and R-squared of the cross-sectional regressions are 
identical to those that use multivariate betas. 




estimates of factor loadings. To mitigate this, we follow the convention in the literature and estimate 
factor loadings for the 27 characteristics balanced portfolios based on 60-month rolling windows. We 
then allocate the more precise portfolio level factor loading to each firm in the portfolio.  
 Our control variables are extensive. Firm size (ln(ME)) is measured as the natural logarithm of 
the product of stock price and the number of shares outstanding at the end of June in year t. Following 
Fama and French (1993), the BM ratio (BM) is defined as book equity value at fiscal year-end in calendar 
year t-1 divided by market equity at the end of December t-1. To control for price momentum (Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 1993), we construct a past return variable, RET(-12,-2), computed as the compounded gross 
return from month j-12 to j-2. Following Fama and French (2015), operating profitability (OP) is 
revenues minus cost of goods sold, minus selling, general, and administrative expenses, minus interest 
expenses, all divided by book equity, and investment (INV) is the change in total assets from fiscal year t-
2 to t-1, divided by t-2 total assets (Inv). Following Jegadeesh (1990), short-term reversal (REV) is 
defined as stock return in the prior month. Following Chordia et al. (2001), a stock’s turnover ratio is 
share trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding. We use the log turnover ratio of month 
j-2 to explain returns in month j (ln(Turn)). Stock illiquidity is measured by the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure (ILLIQ) and liquidity shocks (LIQU) is estimated following Bali et al. (2014). Monthly 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is estimated using daily stock returns within each calendar month 
following Ang et al. (2006). A stock’s extreme positive return (MAX) is its maximum daily returns in the 
previous month following Bali et al. (2011). Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), organization 
capital intensity is estimated by capitalizing selling, general and administrative expenses using the 
perpetual inventory method, and then dividing the capitalized measure by total assets (O-A). Following 
Zhang (2006), a stock’s information uncertainty (ln(DISP)) is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of analysts’ one-year ahead earning per share forecasts over a fiscal 
year, divided by its stock price at the end of December in year t-1. Financial constraint is measured by the 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (KZ index). Asset tangibility is measured as the ratio of net property, 
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plant and equipment to total assets (PPE-A). Bankruptcy risk is captured by the Altman (1968) Z-score 
(Z-score).14 The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix A.1. 
 Throughout Panel B of Table 7, our results support those of Panel A. On its own, the R&D factor 
loading (βRD-HML) explains the cross section of stock returns, but its coefficient estimate is significant only 
at the 10% level. The RD-MV characteristic, on the other hand, is more important. When included jointly 
and with various combinations of control variables in columns (3) to (7), the RD-MV characteristic 
subsumes the R&D factor loading. We conclude that this evidence rejects the covariance risk explanation 
for the R&D anomaly in favor of the mispricing hypothesis. When adding the loadings on RMW and CMA 
in columns (8) and (9), the coefficient on the characteristic retains its magnitude and statistical 
significance, but we see the R&D factor loading significant at the 10% level. Given that this only occurs 
when these controls are added, and our concerns over the adequacy of the post-formation βRD-HML noted 
above, we speculate that this may arise from correlations between factors in the augmented FF-5 model.15  
 
6. Mispricing Tests 
Our covariance versus characteristic results convincingly reject a factor risk explanation for the R&D 
anomaly, in favor of the mispricing explanation. In this final section, we investigate the extent to which 
two potential mechanisms permit the persistence of the R&D anomaly. First, hard to value stocks, of 
which R&D intensive stocks are examples, may be influenced by investor sentiment (Baker and Wugler, 
2006). Following high sentiment states, R&D stocks are overvalued by sentiment driven speculative 
demand, which is corrected when the mispricing reverses. Analogously, after low sentiment states, R&D 
stocks are undervalued due to a lack of speculative demand, which later correct in the higher sentiment 
state. We test whether R&D returns are consistent with these predictions. Second, the mispricing of R&D 
                                                     
14 We verify our results throughout to the inclusion of the liquidity risk factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Since 
this has no impact on our results, we do not report the analysis. 
15 For completeness, the estimated coefficients on other explanatory variables in Table 7 Panel B are consistent with 
prior literature. There is a significant negative size effect and positive value effect. Higher asset growth (Inv) 
(Cooper et al., 2008) and short-term reversal (REV) (Bali et al., 2014) are significantly and negatively related to 
stock returns, while higher organization capital (O-A) is associated with higher returns (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 




stocks may persist due to the inability of investors to arbitrage away the R&D anomaly (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Since one of the most significant limits to arbitrage is the constraint on short sales, this 
impinges on the short leg of the anomaly. We exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in short sale 
constraint provided by the SEC’s Regulation SHO pilot program. Since stocks are assigned to the pilot 
program randomly, we employ a difference-in-differences analysis to identify the causal effect of short 
sale constraints on the R&D anomaly.  
 
6.1. Does Investor Sentiment Affect the R&D Anomaly? 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that during high (low) sentiment states, hard-to-value and costly-to-
arbitrage stocks are subject to more (less) speculative demand and mispricing. Switching between states, 
these stocks should observe subsequent correction of the mispricing, generating lower (higher) future 
returns in proportion to the degree of subjectivity over the firm’s value. Therefore, a mispricing 
explanation of the R&D anomaly implies monotonically declining (increasing) returns to RD-MV quintile 
portfolios following high (low) sentiment states. Furthermore, the magnitude of the cross-sectional return 
patterns should be symmetric across sentiment states. However, Baker and Wurgler (2006) show 
increasing returns with R&D intensity following both sentiment states. The absence of a correction of 
returns following the high state is inconsistent with sentiment induced mispricing. Meanwhile, the 
increasing returns following low sentiment states are consistent with undervaluation from a lack of 
speculative demand, but also with the correction of mispricing emanating from other sources. We extend 
the analysis to control for other characteristics that may be present in R&D stocks to isolate the role of 
sentiment on R&D mispricing. We include the empirical factors of the C-4 and FF-5 models, which 
capture the covariance risk that may exist in R&D returns. Alternatively, these factors may also serve as 
proxies for other mispricing characteristics, such as small firms being more difficult to value (SMB), 
appearing as distressed (HML), or having performed poorly recently (UMD, RMW).  
We use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index proxy, defining high and low sentiment 
states according to its sample median. Subsequent equal and value-weighted returns to size-adjusted R&D 
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quintile portfolios are then averaged within sentiment states.16 Panel A of Table 8 illustrates our results. 
We confirm a monotonic increase in both equal and value-weighted returns across R&D portfolios 
following both sentiment states, consistent with Baker and Wugler (2006). Hard-to-value stocks subject to 
sentiment effects should be overvalued during high sentiment states with returns correcting in subsequent 
periods. Since our pattern in returns is entirely opposite to this prediction, we find no evidence for the 
correction of sentiment driven overvaluation. Following low sentiment states, R&D quintile returns are 
much higher, consistent with underpricing. The 5-1 spread portfolio returns are significantly positive 
following both sentiment states, but they are almost identical across sentiment states, which suggest that 
sentiment has little effect on the R&D anomaly. Panel A also shows that the differences between R&D 
quintile returns across high and low sentiment states are stable across the R&D quintiles, inconsistent 
with sentiment effects.17  
Insert Table 8 about here 
Panels B and C report the estimated C-4 and FF-5 alphas. In both panels, the patterns of the 
alphas are largely consistent with Panel A and for both equally and value weighted returns, although the 
magnitude of the estimates are lower when value weighting. We find estimated alphas increasing across 
R&D portfolios following both sentiment states such that the intercept for the 5-1 spread portfolio return 
is significant in nearly all cases. This suggests that, even after including appropriate controls, undervalued 
R&D stocks are corrected and this occurs irrespective of sentiment state. Increasing alphas across 
quintiles following the high sentiment state is not consistent with sentiment driven mispricing. 
Furthermore, the within quintile spreads between alphas following high and low sentiment states are 
                                                     
16  Specifically, sentiment state is measured at the end of year t-1 and subsequent R&D portfolio returns are 
calculated from July of year t to June of year t+1. This maintains consistency with our earlier methods. Calculating 
returns for the twelve months from January of year t instead makes no difference to our results. 
17 One may argue that the lower returns (significant at the 5% level; see the H-L p-value in panel A) of portfolio 1 
during high than low sentiment states are consistent with low-R&D stocks being overpriced in the presence of short 
sales constraints. As pointed out by Stambaugh et al. (2012), overpricing among stocks in the short leg may persist 
because short sales constraints prevent such mispricing to be fully exploited by informed traders. As such, when 
overpricing is prevalent when sentiment is high, stocks in the short leg would be most overpriced and will correct to 
yield lower returns (than the long legs when sentiment is high and the short leg returns during low sentiment). 
Nonetheless, such patterns disappear in panels B and C after factor risk is controlled for, suggesting that this 
overpricing explanation is unlikely to fully explain the R&D anomaly. 
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precisely opposite to the predictions of the sentiment driven mispricing hypothesis. This spread should 
reduce across quintiles, whereas we show that it increases. 
 More detailed inspection of Panels B and C reveals even stronger evidence to refute mispricing 
driven by sentiment. Consistent with Panel A, the alphas following high (low) sentiment states are lower 
(higher) than the corresponding estimates in Table 1. After adjusting for characteristics, high (low) 
sentiment reduces (accentuates) the abnormal returns to all quintiles. In contrast to Panel A, the alphas on 
the 5-1 spread portfolios are higher (lower) following high (low) sentiment states. Instead of lower returns 
when high sentiment mispricing is corrected, we find that the abnormal returns are in fact larger following 
the high than the low sentiment state. This is partly due to the returns on the extreme R&D quintiles 
following low sentiment states. In all cases, the estimated alphas for portfolios 4 and 5 detract from the 
patterns described above. Whilst still increasing across quintiles, they are higher compared to Table 1 
until portfolio 3, then become lower in portfolios 4 and 5. Under the sentiment hypothesis, these should 
be higher. For the value weighted returns, the slightly lower alpha on portfolio 5 causes the 5-1 spread 
portfolio alpha to be insignificant at the 5% level. This is not consistent with the sentiment hypothesis. At 
least some of the correction of the mispricing of the most R&D intensive stocks is captured by other 
characteristics. 
 
6.2. Do Short Sale Constraints Increase the R&D Anomaly?  
In the absence of sentiment driven mispricing, we next investigate whether limits to arbitrage affect the 
R&D anomaly. In a frictionless and efficient market, mispricing should be arbitraged away. However, 
frictions make the costs and risks of arbitrage prohibitive, leading to persistent mispricing (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). One of the most significant limits to arbitrage is short-sale constraints (Lamont and 
Thaler, 2003), under which, arbitrageurs face significant costs or restrictions to short-selling. If the R&D 
anomaly reflects limits to arbitrage, we could expect short-sale constraints to supply the conditions for the 
R&D anomaly to persist.  
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 The existing literature offers several indirect proxies for short-sale constraints, including the 
breadth of ownership, institutional ownership, short interest and costs of stock borrowing (Chen et al., 
2002; Hirshleifer et al., 2011; Asquith et al., 2005; Drechsler and Drechsler, 2014). However, as noted by 
Fang et al. (2016), since these proxies are likely to be correlated with pricing factors and other risk-related 
firm characteristics, it may be difficult to isolate the true effect of short-sale constraints on asset prices. 
To address this challenge, we exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in the restriction on short-selling 
provided by the pilot program under Regulation SHO and perform a difference-in-differences analysis to 
identify the causal effect of limits to arbitrage on the R&D anomaly.  
 In July 2004, the SEC initiated a pilot program under Regulation SHO to facilitate research into 
the effects of short-sale price tests on stock markets. Under the pilot program, a random sample of stocks 
was selected and a short-sale restriction on these stocks was removed over a designated period. 
Specifically, within the Russell 3000 index constituents as at June 2004, Regulation SHO selected every 
third stock ranked by trading volume within each Exchange as a pilot stock. The pilot stocks were 
exempted from the uptick rule (called the bid price test) from May 2, 2005 to August 6, 2007 and were 
therefore easier to sell short relative to the non-pilot stocks. Because the pilot program is a randomized 
experiment, the plausibly exogenous variation in short-sale restrictions allows us to identify the effect of 
short sale constraints on the R&D anomaly. 
 We begin with 986 pilot stocks and 1,966 non-pilot stocks in the Russell 3000 index obtained 
from Fang et al. (2016).18, 19 However, to ensure the balance of covariates between the treatment and 
control groups, we only include the pilot and non-pilot stocks that are within our R&D sample. This 
sample consists of 446 pilot R&D stocks and 922 non-pilot R&D stocks. Our sample period remains the 
same and covers the period July 1975 to June 2013. 
                                                     
18 The list of 986 pilot stocks is published by the SEC (2004). Among the non-pilot stocks, Fang et al. (2016) use 
Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database, the Compustat database and CRSP monthly 
files to identify firms that went public, had spinoffs or were not exchange-listed after April 30, 2004. These stocks 
are excluded from the non-pilot sample. See Fang et al. (2016) for further details. 
19 We are extremely grateful to Professor Vivian Fang for sharing the list of pilot and non-pilot stocks with us. 
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 While existing studies show that the assignment of pilot stocks is random (Chu et al., 2016; Fang 
et al., 2016), our sampling requirement of non-zero R&D expenditure firms may introduce selection bias. 
Therefore, we evaluate the balance of covariates between the pilot and non-pilot stocks at the end of 
2003, prior to the announcement of Regulation SHO. Panel A of Table 9 compares the average 
characteristics between the pilot and non-pilot stocks (Full) and the averages in the top 20% of RD-MV 
(Long) and bottom 20% of RD-MV firms (Short) across the groups. There are very few differences 
between the two groups. Firms in the treatment group have smaller average ln(BM) and lower tangible 
assets in the short leg. Since it is the spread between the high and low R&D stocks that drives the 
anomaly, comparing the Long and Short spread in RD-MV is essential to ensure that the treatment and 
control groups are comparable for our test.20 The treatment group contains firms with lower average RD-
MV by only 2.1% (unreported tests show the medians are not different from each other). Average RD-MV 
of the long and short legs are not significantly different across the treatment and control groups, 
suggesting that the Long-Short spreads in RD-MV are unlikely to be significantly different. These 
statistics show that the observables are in general similar across the two groups, which likely satisfies the 
parallel trend assumption (Roberts and Whited, 2012). 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 To examine the effect of short sale constraints on the R&D anomaly, we form two sets of quintile 
portfolios based on year t-1 RD-MV, one for the pilot sample and one for the non-pilot stocks. 
Specifically, to improve the test, we apply the R&D breakpoints from the full sample to the quintile 
portfolio sorts in this analysis. For each set of quintiles, we calculate the equal and value-weighted 
average monthly returns for the zero-cost portfolio that goes long the high-R&D portfolio and short the 
low-R&D portfolio (Long-Short), which captures the anomalous R&D returns. We then estimate the 
following difference-in-differences model: 
RETit = αt + β1 Piloti + β2 Piloti × Duringt + β3 Piloti × Postt + εit ,       (2) 
                                                     
20 We are very grateful to the referee for this and many other suggestions that have improved this section. 
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where RETit is the average monthly portfolio returns on the Long-Short portfolio. We also separate the 
Long and Short legs of the spread portfolio for deeper analysis. Piloti is a treatment dummy variable equal 
to one if stock i is a pilot stock, and zero otherwise. Duringt is a dummy variable equal to one if month t 
falls during the pilot program from June 2005 to July 2007. Therefore, β2 captures the average treatment 
effect of the removal of the short-sale restriction on the R&D anomaly. Specifically, it compares the 
Long-Short return difference before and after the implementation of the pilot program, and between the 
pilot and non-pilot stock samples. We also investigate whether the effect on returns of lifting the short-
sale restriction disappears after the program ended in August 2007 by including the interaction between 
Piloti and Postt. Postt is a dummy variable equal to one if month t is on or after August 2007. We also 
include monthly dummy variables to account for economy-wide shocks that may drive stock returns. We 
estimate equation (2) for Long-Short, Long and Short portfolio returns separately. Panels B to C of Table 
9 report the coefficient estimates and their Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics. Both panels show 
estimation results for raw portfolio excess returns and C-4 and FF-5 adjusted returns.  
  To the extent that limits to arbitrage enable periods of mispricing, we would expect the removal 
of a short-sale restriction under the pilot program to facilitate arbitrage and reduce the R&D anomaly. We 
find no empirical support for this prediction. In Panel B where equal weighted portfolio returns are 
analyzed, we find no significant coefficient estimates for Pilot×During in the zero-cost spread portfolio 
or the long and short legs, inconsistent with a mispricing explanation. In addition, the estimates for 
Pilot×Post are also insignificant, suggesting that the R&D anomaly does not change significantly after 
the SHO program ended. Examining value-weighted portfolio returns in Panel C, we again find that the 
critical coefficient estimate on Pilot×During is insignificant in all model specifications. Interestingly, our 
tests reveal that Pilot×Post enters negatively and significantly into the zero cost spread portfolio, 
suggesting that the R&D anomaly reduces significantly after the program had ended. Such results persist 
after accounting for characteristics in the C-4 and FF-5 models. However, this is only observed in the 
long, but not in the short leg. While this evidence may be driven by potential confounding effects 
occurring at the time of the short-sale ban removal, our finding that the short leg is unaffected maintains 
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the interpretation that the R&D anomaly is not related to limits to arbitrage in the form of short sale 
constraints. 
 A potential concern of this analysis is that the R&D anomaly may be more relevant to those R&D 
stocks that are not in the Russell 3000 and so were not eligible for the pilot. We repeat this analysis to 
compare the pilot stocks against the remaining R&D stocks. 21  Unsurprisingly, there are more 
characteristics showing significant differences. More importantly, the average RD-MV 21% higher in the 
non-Russell 3000 group in the top R&D quintile, but our results are similar to those reported in Table 9. 
Therefore, the assignment of treatment status is not random, and, these additional results likely suffer 
from selection issues. 
 Finally, we test the joint effects of sentiment driven mispricing and short sale constraints on the 
R&D anomaly. During the Regulation SHO sub-sample, we follow the methodology of Stambaugh et al. 
(2012) to investigate the role of sentiment on the anomaly for pilot and non-pilot stocks. Since our 
analysis finds no convincing effect of sentiment on the anomaly and no differences between the groups to 
suggest any effect from the lifting of short sale constraints, we do not report the results for brevity, but 
conclude that these issues do not explain the mispricing in R&D stocks.22 More details about these tests 
can be found in Tables IA.9 and IA.10 of the online appendix. 
 
7. Conclusion 
There is considerable evidence of a significant positive relation between R&D investment and future 
stock returns, which is not explained by empirical asset pricing models. A common explanation is 
mispricing, which argues that limits to arbitrage or behavioral traits cause R&D stocks to be undervalued. 
When these market frictions or psychological heuristics are resolved, the mispricing is corrected and 
                                                     
21 We do not report the results for brevity, but show them in Table IA.8 of the online appendix. 
22 The only potential effect we find is a significantly positive alpha to the short leg of the anomaly following periods 
of high sentiment for the pilot stocks under the FF-5 model. This could indicate that sentiment driven overpricing of 
low R&D stocks may have been eliminated by short sellers during high sentiment states, with the stocks correcting 
subsequently as short positions were covered when the sentiment state switched from high to low.  However, 
without corroborating evidence from the non-pilot stocks, this interpretation is tentative.  
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strong positive returns are earned. Alternatively, abnormal R&D returns may represent rational 
compensation for bearing systematic risk, which emanates from the real options embedded in R&D 
projects and is not captured in conventional pricing models. Resolution of this debate relies on rigorous 
empirical methods.  
We contribute to the literature by providing more stringent and direct tests that can eliminate one 
of the assertions. We show that the R&D characteristic is more important than the loading on a R&D 
factor for predicting the cross section of future returns, so we reject the covariance risk explanation in 
favor of the mispricing hypothesis. Motivated by this evidence, we test for the correction of R&D 
mispricing using the cross-sectional effects of investor sentiment and a natural experiment on the limits to 
arbitrage. Our results are consistent with the significant undervaluation of R&D stocks, but this is not 
related to investor sentiment. Finally, we estimate a difference-in-differences analysis to identify the 
causal effect of short selling constraints on the R&D anomaly. We find that lifting short sale constraints 
under the SEC’s Regulation SHO pilot program has no significant effect on the R&D anomaly. In sum, 
our evidence is consistent with mispricing, but we do not identify any mechanisms, incremental to extant 
studies such as Cohen et al. (2013) and Hirshleifer et al. (2013), that cause the mispricing to persist. 
 There are two particular features of our findings that motivate deeper analysis in future. In 
relation to systematic risk, the correlation between the returns on the R&D factor and those on size, value, 
profitability and investment factors may induce overfitting. Second, R&D is known to interact with 
financial constraints (Li, 2011) and product market competition (Gu, 2016). Third, Donelson and Resutek 
(2012) suggest that the R&D anomaly is part of the larger value anomaly. Teasing out these correlation 
and interactions present a formidable challenge. On the mispricing argument, the positive relation 
between the R&D, value and profitability factors present great potential to extend the ideas of Daniel and 
Titman (2006) and Donelson and Resutek (2012) to distinguish the under reaction to intangible 
information heuristic from the pessimistic extrapolation of poor performance (Lakonishok et al., 1994). 
Alternatively, researchers may focus on investors’ interpretations of the uncertainty of R&D, or their prior 
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Size-Adjusted R&D Quintile Portfolio Returns 
 
This table reports the details of the size-adjusted RD-MV sorted quintile portfolios. We sort 
stocks independently into 2×5 Size-RD-MV portfolios and compute their equal and value-
weighted average returns. Within each RD-MV rank, we average the portfolio returns across the 
big and small portfolios. Panels A and B report the size-adjusted equally-weighted (EW) and 
value-weighted (VW) average monthly simple (RET) and risk-adjusted stock returns. C-4 α and 
FF-5 α are the estimated intercept of time-series regressions based on the Carhart (1997) four-
factor and Fama and French (2015) five-factor models. We also report the zero-cost portfolio 
that goes long Portfolio 5 and short Portfolio 1. The t-statistics in brackets are calculated based 
on Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors.  
 
  1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) 5-1 
 
Panel A. Equally weighted portfolio returns 
 
EW RET 0.43% 0.77% 1.03% 1.29% 1.67% 1.24% 
 
[1.336] [2.280] [2.917] [3.265] [3.519] [5.238] 
EW C-4 α -0.16% 0.16% 0.38% 0.60% 0.93% 1.09% 
 
[-1.311] [1.263] [3.731] [4.087] [4.326] [5.188] 
EW FF5 α -0.17% 0.14% 0.39% 0.65% 1.01% 1.18% 
 
[-1.236] [1.049] [3.968] [4.970] [4.907] [5.636] 
       Panel B. Value-weighted portfolio returns 
 
VW RET 0.37% 0.57% 0.76% 1.00% 1.18% 0.81% 
 
[1.421] [1.986] [2.579] [2.941] [2.887] [3.538] 
VW C-4 α -0.28% -0.11% 0.07% 0.23% 0.28% 0.56% 
 
[-3.728] [-1.376] [0.937] [2.100] [1.637] [2.979] 
VW FF5 α -0.16% -0.03% 0.15% 0.39% 0.47% 0.62% 
 












The RD-HML Factor 
This table summarizes the RD-HML factor and its relationship to other pricing factors. Panel A reports the 
summary statistics and Panel B reports the pairwise correlations between the pricing factors and the 
corresponding p-values. In panel C, the RD-HML factor is regressed on other pricing factors. The model 
specifications of rows (1), (2), (3) and (4) follow the CAPM, FF-3, C-4 and FF-5 models. SMB3 and HML3 
are the FF-3 size and value factors, whereas SMB5 and HML5 denote the FF-5 size and value factors. 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
  Obs. Mean Stdev Sharpe ratio 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
RD-HML 456 0.68% 3.59% 0.19 -4.33% -1.22% 0.60% 2.34% 5.74% 
MKT 456 0.58% 4.52% 0.13 -7.26% -1.96% 1.03% 3.54% 7.19% 
SMB3 456 0.26% 3.05% 0.08 -4.02% -1.33% 0.16% 2.05% 4.83% 
HML3 456 0.36% 2.97% 0.12 -4.19% -1.18% 0.34% 1.74% 5.22% 
SMB5 456 0.28% 2.97% 0.09 -4.13% -1.33% 0.13% 2.09% 4.96% 
HML5 456 0.36% 2.97% 0.12 -4.19% -1.18% 0.34% 1.74% 5.22% 
UMD 456 0.67% 4.46% 0.15 -6.84% -0.78% 0.72% 2.85% 6.73% 
RMW 456 0.34% 2.26% 0.15 -2.58% -0.75% 0.26% 1.39% 3.75% 
CMA 456 0.35% 1.94% 0.18 -2.70% -0.89% 0.24% 1.52% 3.43% 
Panel B. Correlation With Pricing Factors 
Correlation RD-HML MKT SMB3 HML3 UMD SMB5 HML5 RMW CMA 
RD-HML 1.000                 
 
― 
        MKT 0.315 1.000 
       
 
0.000 ― 
       SMB3 0.581 0.253 1.000 
      
 
0.000 0.000 ― 
      HML3 -0.228 -0.314 -0.272 1.000 
     
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 ― 
     UMD -0.022 -0.087 0.085 -0.169 1.000 
    
 
0.642 0.064 0.071 0.000 ― 
    SMB5 0.559 0.233 0.986 -0.159 0.066 1.000 
   
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.162 ― 
   HML5 -0.228 -0.314 -0.272 1.000 -0.169 -0.159 1.000 
  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 ― 
  RMW -0.547 -0.270 -0.485 0.224 0.098 -0.423 0.224 1.000 
 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 ― 
 CMA -0.004 -0.379 -0.126 0.700 0.004 -0.057 0.700 0.029 1.000 
  0.939 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.935 0.227 0.000 0.540 ― 
Panel C. Factor Spanning Tests 
 
Variables Mean α MKT SMB3 HML3 UMD SMB5 HML5 RMW CMA R2 N 
(1) 0.68% 0.0054 0.2497 
       
0.099 456 
t-stat [3.716] [3.146] [6.341] 
         (2) 
 
0.0046 0.1358 0.6224 -0.0363 




[2.974] [2.609] [4.902] [-0.383] 
       (3) 
 
0.0050 0.1277 0.6275 -0.0510 -0.0484 




[3.324] [2.685] [4.910] [-0.534] [-0.716] 
      (4) 
 
0.0058 0.1350 
   




   




             TABLE 3 
ICAPM Tests: Single Predictive Regressions for Market Returns  
 
This table reports the results for single variable predictive regressions for the monthly continuously 
compounded return of the CRSP value-weighted market index, at horizons of 1, 3, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 
months ahead. The forecasting variable is the current values of the R&D state variable proxy (RD-
HML*). To estimate this state variable, we first sort stocks independently into 2×3=6 portfolios by Size 
and RD-MV. For each portfolio, we compute the sum of market capitalization and book equity plus R&D 
expenses. We then divide the total market value by total book equity plus R&D expenses to obtain the 
ratio TMV-TBVRD. To adjust for the size effect, we equal average the ratio across the size portfolios for 
the top and bottom R&D portfolios. RD-HML* is the high-minus-low size-adjusted TMV-TBVRD. For 
each regression, we report the coefficient estimates, Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors 
adjusted using q lag (in parentheses) and R-squared.  
 
Predictor q=1 q=3 q=12 q=24 q=36 q=48 q=60 
RD-HML* 0.0065* 0.0195** 0.0867*** 0.1873*** 0.3097*** 0.4432*** 0.5600*** 
 
(0.0037) (0.0096) (0.0332) (0.0554) (0.0499) (0.0577) (0.0749) 
Obs. 455 453 444 432 420 408 396 




















ICAPM Tests: Multivariate Predictive Regressions for Market Returns 
 
Panels A to G of this table report the results of multivariate predictive regressions for the monthly 
continuously compounded return of the CRSP value-weighted market index at horizons of 1, 3, 12, 24, 
36, 48, and 60 months ahead. The forecasting variable of interest is the current value of the R&D state 
variable proxy (RD-HML*). We control for other state variables associated with the SMB, HML, and 
UMD factors by constructing their proxies following Maio and Santa-Clara (2012). SMB* is the 
difference between the monthly BM-adjusted market-to-book ratios of small and big stocks; HML* is the 
difference between the monthly size-adjusted market-to-book ratios of value and growth stocks. CUMD is 
the cumulative sum of the monthly UMD factor over the last 60 months. Rows labelled (1) and (2) 
indicate FF-3 and C-4 models. For each regression, we report the coefficient estimates, the Newey and 
West (1987) robust standard errors adjusted for q lags (in parentheses) and R-squared.  
 
Row SMB* HML* CUMD RDHML* Obs. R2 
Panel A. q=1 
(1) 0.0067 0.0019 
 





  (2) 0.0047 0.0028 -0.0047 0.0010 455 0.0103 
 
(0.0164) (0.0046) (0.0079) (0.0085) 
  
       Panel B. q=3 
(3) 0.0225 0.0042 
 





  (4) 0.0186 0.0057 -0.0089 0.0063 453 0.0268 
 
(0.0410) (0.0124) (0.0198) (0.0223) 
  
       Panel C. q=12 
(5) 0.0878 -0.0080 
 





  (6) 0.1174 -0.0197 0.0780 0.0973* 444 0.1222 
 
(0.1674) (0.0300) (0.0764) (0.0547) 
  
       Panel D. q=24 
(7) 0.1923 -0.0492 
 





  (8) 0.2965 -0.0798* 0.2734** 0.2627*** 432 0.3163 
 
(0.2907) (0.0446) (0.1228) (0.0928) 
  
       Panel E. q=36 
(9) 0.0279 -0.0930 
 





  (10) 0.2327 -0.1146 0.5011*** 0.4641*** 420 0.4545 
 
(0.3633) (0.0876) (0.1695) (0.1079) 
  
       Panel F. q=48 
(11) -0.2458 -0.1068 
 





  (12) 0.2311 -0.1135 0.7938*** 0.6027*** 408 0.5255 
 
(0.2926) (0.1104) (0.2579) (0.1505) 
  
       Panel G. q=60 
(13) -0.2234 -0.1499 
 







  (14) 0.3482 -0.1174 0.9414*** 0.7062** 396 0.5028 
 
(0.3314) (0.1648) (0.2784) (0.2864) 



























Factor Pricing in the Cross Section 
 
This table examines prices of covariance risk in the cross section. Panel A (Panel B) [Panel C] uses value-
weighted returns to 25 portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market equity ratio (momentum) [RD-MV] as 
test assets. To estimate the factor loadings, we estimate the FF-3 and C-4 model augmented with the RD-
HML factor using a 60-month rolling window and examine whether the estimated factor loadings explain 
the cross section of subsequent average returns using Fama-MacBeth regressions. We report the estimated 
coefficients, Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics, the average R-squared, and the number of 
months.  
 
































   
0.0021 0.0008 






















months 396 396 
 
396 396 
































   
0.0056** 0.0055** 


















Average R2 0.497 0.550 
 
0.550 0.598 











  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 






















   
-0.0044 -0.0033 


















Average R2 0.310 0.410 
 
0.350 0.445 








Covariance vs. Characteristics: Portfolio Evidence 
 
This table reports the results examining whether covariance or characteristics explain the R&D anomaly. In Panel A, we first sort R&D stocks independently into 3×3 
ME and RD-MV portfolios at their respective 30th and 70th breakpoints. In each of the 9 portfolios, we further divide stocks into 3 portfolios (at 30th and 70th 
breakpoints) according to the estimated preformation R&D factor loadings (Pre-βRD-HML). To estimate the preformation R&D factor loadings, we follow Daniel and 
Titman (1997) and regress stock returns on the RD-HML factor over the previous 60 months (skipping the most recent 6 months) before the portfolio formation date. 
Panel A reports the equal and value-weighted characteristics (size, RD-MV, Pre-βRD-HML, and excess returns) for each of the 27 portfolios. In the first column, the three 
letters denote the rank for ME, RD-MV, and Pre-βRD-HML. S/M/B denote small, medium, and big stocks; L/M/H denote low, middle, and high portfolios. We also report the 
estimated post-formation alpha and RD-HML factor loadings from estimating the augmented C-4 model with the RD-HML factor. Panel B presents results from the 9 
characteristics-balanced portfolios, which are the spread portfolios between the high and low preformation R&D factor loadings portfolios within each size and RD-MV 
categories. We then equal average the 9 characteristics-balanced portfolios to arrive at a combined portfolio for an overall test.  
 
Panel A. 27 Portfolios 
 
Equal weighted portfolios 
 
Value weighted portfolios 
 
ME RD-MV Pre-βRD-HML RET t(RET) α t(α) βRD-HML t(βRD-HML)   ME RD-MV Pre-βRD-HML RET t(RET) α t(α) βRD-HML t(βRD-HML) 
S/L/L 27.03 1.09% -0.45 0.61% [1.425] 0.26% [0.821] -0.179 [-2.006] 
 
34.81 1.25% -0.42 0.12% [0.294] -0.30% [-1.065] -0.277 [-3.342] 
S/L/M 28.40 1.13% 0.80 0.97% [2.034] 0.33% [1.132] 0.182 [1.263] 
 
35.70 1.20% 0.81 0.65% [1.683] 0.05% [0.204] 0.005 [0.053] 
S/L/H 28.39 1.14% 2.31 0.81% [1.492] 0.26% [0.627] -0.070 [-0.506] 
 
35.94 1.40% 2.30 0.25% [0.458] -0.54% [-1.515] 0.061 [0.480] 
                    S/M/L 24.19 4.71% -0.22 1.10% [2.792] 0.67% [2.511] -0.044 [-0.536] 
 
33.54 4.59% -0.18 0.76% [2.007] 0.19% [0.839] -0.052 [-0.684] 
S/M/M 28.13 4.84% 0.94 1.20% [2.751] 0.68% [2.067] 0.053 [0.465] 
 
36.96 4.92% 0.95 0.88% [2.126] 0.17% [0.876] 0.133 [1.798] 
S/M/H 27.25 4.95% 2.54 1.43% [2.459] 0.90% [2.077] 0.332 [1.774] 
 
36.20 5.82% 2.54 0.77% [1.391] 0.07% [0.230] 0.353 [2.185] 
                    S/H/L 19.90 22.18% -0.04 1.99% [4.067] 1.19% [4.223] 0.480 [3.674] 
 
30.57 17.14% 0.02 1.56% [3.166] 0.59% [2.167] 0.602 [5.471] 
S/H/M 23.52 24.33% 1.26 1.97% [3.691] 1.16% [3.932] 0.554 [4.384] 
 
33.26 19.34% 1.26 1.59% [3.010] 0.57% [2.461] 0.600 [6.554] 
S/H/H 25.94 28.80% 2.93 2.08% [3.080] 1.08% [2.735] 0.904 [5.363] 
 
35.07 22.61% 2.89 1.37% [2.119] 0.23% [0.782] 0.902 [6.957] 
                    M/L/L 221.96 1.09% 0.02 0.49% [1.531] -0.02% [-0.115] -0.304 [-5.833] 
 
294.69 1.04% 0.04 0.58% [1.923] 0.05% [0.346] -0.343 [-5.347] 
M/L/M 226.29 1.13% 0.91 0.51% [1.449] -0.06% [-0.426] -0.132 [-3.129] 
 
298.35 1.11% 0.91 0.54% [1.584] -0.11% [-0.994] -0.098 [-2.842] 
M/L/H 216.42 1.16% 2.21 0.27% [0.571] -0.14% [-0.398] -0.010 [-0.082] 
 
285.55 1.30% 2.19 0.06% [0.145] -0.50% [-2.289] -0.001 [-0.007] 
                    M/M/L 211.64 4.45% 0.22 0.90% [2.619] 0.16% [1.156] 0.013 [0.261] 
 
292.25 4.02% 0.24 0.92% [2.791] 0.11% [0.841] 0.022 [0.457] 
M/M/M 220.76 4.69% 1.19 0.94% [2.476] 0.23% [1.982] 0.164 [3.934] 
 
297.86 4.36% 1.18 0.88% [2.401] 0.02% [0.145] 0.266 [6.468] 
M/M/H 212.64 4.94% 2.56 0.75% [1.416] -0.01% [-0.064] 0.466 [5.326] 
 
286.69 4.97% 2.50 0.65% [1.297] -0.26% [-1.653] 0.488 [7.552] 
                    M/H/L 168.95 16.87% 0.49 1.23% [2.887] 0.32% [1.628] 0.368 [5.431] 
 
237.34 13.01% 0.51 1.12% [2.653] 0.10% [0.571] 0.373 [6.304] 
M/H/M 183.88 17.05% 1.56 1.50% [2.873] 0.50% [2.471] 0.655 [9.074] 
 
259.54 13.71% 1.56 1.43% [2.730] 0.26% [1.455] 0.802 [10.214] 
M/H/H 165.76 19.51% 2.94 0.91% [1.432] -0.22% [-0.967] 0.881 [8.056] 
 
233.53 15.39% 2.90 0.72% [1.208] -0.57% [-2.436] 0.915 [11.601] 
                    B/L/L 16671.12 1.01% -0.04 0.61% [2.614] 0.19% [1.718] -0.244 [-4.307] 
 
87881.59 0.91% -0.15 0.60% [2.778] 0.24% [2.047] -0.303 [-5.410] 
B/L/M 6710.00 1.12% 0.67 0.66% [2.286] 0.19% [2.010] -0.159 [-4.241] 
 
66532.32 1.09% 0.61 0.57% [1.997] 0.20% [1.726] -0.181 [-2.691] 
B/L/H 3662.06 1.19% 1.61 0.58% [1.448] 0.03% [0.155] 0.197 [2.677] 
 
20041.87 1.15% 1.51 0.69% [1.699] 0.10% [0.520] 0.221 [3.499] 
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                    B/M/L 11182.34 4.01% 0.27 0.95% [3.845] 0.35% [3.405] 0.003 [0.055] 
 
51164.40 3.56% 0.22 0.72% [3.389] 0.21% [1.851] 0.043 [0.991] 
B/M/M 6561.57 4.28% 0.97 0.91% [2.867] 0.24% [2.552] 0.174 [3.995] 
 
40936.17 3.93% 0.95 0.79% [2.493] 0.10% [0.930] 0.408 [6.807] 
B/M/H 3151.45 4.69% 2.08 0.80% [1.739] 0.02% [0.105] 0.565 [9.239] 
 
18102.81 4.10% 1.89 0.78% [1.837] 0.00% [0.015] 0.553 [8.583] 
                    B/H/L 5289.92 13.37% 0.55 1.17% [3.687] 0.33% [1.684] 0.344 [2.931] 
 
19231.04 11.77% 0.56 0.90% [3.047] 0.10% [0.447] 0.540 [5.093] 
B/H/M 4017.48 14.54% 1.41 1.34% [3.294] 0.32% [1.941] 0.692 [11.007] 
 
13474.28 13.54% 1.38 1.06% [2.590] -0.23% [-1.119] 0.944 [13.608] 
B/H/H 2110.00 16.14% 2.56 1.19% [2.082] 0.03% [0.111] 0.969 [10.691] 
 
6632.48 13.27% 2.42 1.09% [1.863] -0.25% [-0.838] 1.099 [9.999] 
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Panel B. 9 Characteristics-Balanced Portfolios 
 




RET t(RET) α t(α) βRD-HML t(βRD-HML)   RET t(RET) α t(α) βRD-HML t(βRD-HML) 
S/L 0.20% [0.542] 0.01% [0.017] 0.109 [0.818] 
 
0.13% [0.345] -0.24% [-0.607] 0.337 [2.546] 
S/M 0.33% [0.917] 0.24% [0.648] 0.376 [2.293] 
 
0.00% [0.006] -0.13% [-0.431] 0.405 [2.580] 
S/H 0.09% [0.307] -0.11% [-0.367] 0.424 [3.141] 
 
-0.19% [-0.651] -0.36% [-1.174] 0.301 [2.591] 
              M/L -0.22% [-0.764] -0.13% [-0.333] 0.294 [2.026] 
 
-0.51% [-1.728] -0.55% [-1.992] 0.342 [2.758] 
M/M -0.16% [-0.537] -0.17% [-0.728] 0.453 [4.557] 
 
-0.27% [-0.889] -0.37% [-1.862] 0.467 [6.070] 
M/H -0.32% [-1.048] -0.55% [-2.291] 0.512 [4.511] 
 
-0.39% [-1.287] -0.67% [-2.547] 0.541 [5.326] 
              B/L -0.03% [-0.093] -0.17% [-0.801] 0.441 [4.361] 
 
0.09% [0.282] -0.14% [-0.571] 0.524 [6.742] 
B/M -0.15% [-0.474] -0.33% [-1.574] 0.563 [6.316] 
 
0.06% [0.160] -0.21% [-0.909] 0.509 [6.149] 
B/H 0.02% [0.043] -0.30% [-0.930] 0.625 [3.735] 
 
0.18% [0.401] -0.35% [-0.831] 0.560 [3.377] 
              Combined -0.03% [-0.100] -0.17%  [-0.890] 0.422 [4.800] 
 






















Covariance vs. Characteristics: Multivariate Tests 
 
This table presents multivariate tests examining the relative importance between covariance and characteristics in 
explaining the R&D anomaly. Panels A and B report results at the portfolio and firm levels, respectively. In Panel A, 
we use 3×3×3=27 portfolios sorted by size, RD-MV, and the estimated preformation R&D factor loadings as test assets. 
To estimate the postformation loadings for MKT, SMB, HML, UMD, RMW, CMA, and RD-HML, we regress the 
average returns of each portfolio univariately on each of the pricing factors on a 60-month rolling window and use 
these estimated postformation factor loadings to explain the cross section of portfolio returns in Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) cross-sectional regressions. Avg. RD-MV is the equal or value-weighted average portfolio RD-MV. We report in 
parentheses the Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics, the average R-squared, and number of months for the 
estimation. Panel B reports firm-level Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. To reduce measurement 
errors, we assign the postformation factor loadings estimated at the portfolio level used in Panel A to their constituent 
stocks. The detailed definition of the firm characteristic controls can be found in Appendix A.1. We report Newey and 
West (1987) robust t-statistics (in squared brackets), average R-squared, and number of observations for each model. 
Symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 




Equal weighted portfolio returns 
 
Value weighted portfolio returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
βMKT -0.014* -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
 
-0.013** -0.010* -0.009 -0.017*** 
 
[-1.742] [-1.015] [-0.838] [-0.677] 
 
[-2.168] [-1.704] [-1.605] [-2.676] 
βSMB -0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
 
-0.005 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 
 
[-1.107] [-0.303] [0.651] [0.704] 
 
[-1.359] [-0.051] [-0.048] [-0.396] 
βHML 0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.004 
 
-0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.007 
 
[0.870] [0.023] [0.409] [-0.632] 
 
[-0.007] [-1.202] [-0.407] [1.225] 
βUMD -0.001 -0.007 -0.005 
  
-0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 
 
[-0.198] [-1.305] [-0.827] 
  
[-0.668] [-1.016] [-0.987] 
 βRMW 
   
0.004 
    
-0.003 
    
[0.809] 
    
[-0.716] 
βCMA 
   
0.004 
    
-0.006** 
    
[0.934] 
    
[-2.164] 
βRD-HML 0.014**  -0.006 -0.000 0.014**  0.002 0.003 
 [2.280]  [-0.892] [-0.066]  [2.397]  [0.405] [0.428] 
Avg. RD-MV 
 
0.042*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 
  
0.043*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 
  
[4.829] [4.860] [4.828] 
  
[3.819] [3.300] [3.534] 
Intercept 0.016*** 0.011** 0.011** 0.014*** 
 
0.011*** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
 
[3.286] [2.420] [2.287] [3.027] 
 
[2.996] [2.488] [2.673] [3.191] 
Average R2 0.472 0.475 0.515 0.547 
 
0.466 0.464 0.511 0.544 
Number of months 342 342 342 342 
 
342 342 342 342 
         





Panel B. Firm-Level Analysis 
 
RET 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
βRD-HML 0.005* 
 




[0.886] [0.316] [0.284] [1.401] [1.423] [1.951] [1.805] 
RD-MV 
 
0.023*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.014** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
  
[3.536] [3.888] [2.783] [2.464] [3.837] [3.904] [3.577] [3.749] 
ln(ME) 
   
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
    
[-1.353] [-1.167] [-2.214] [-2.024] [-2.316] [-2.343] 
ln(BM) 
   
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
    
[2.828] [2.851] [2.901] [2.845] [2.666] [4.251] 
RET(2,12) 
   
-0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
    
[-0.117] [-0.285] [0.436] [0.524] [0.475] [0.222] 
OP 
    
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
     
[0.557] [0.927] [0.966] [0.842] [1.205] 
INV 
    
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
     
[-5.031] [-3.611] [-3.880] [-3.772] [-3.443] 
REV 
     
-0.048*** -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.054*** 
      
[-6.680] [-6.691] [-6.746] [-7.653] 
ln(TURN) 
     
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
      
[0.801] [0.699] [0.782] [0.907] 
ILLIQ 
     
0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.003 
      
[0.242] [0.187] [0.182] [-0.147] 
LIQU
     
0.017 0.018 0.021 0.019 
      
[0.894] [1.019] [1.121] [0.975] 
ln(IVOL) 
     
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
      
[-0.532] [-0.871] [-0.799] [-1.158] 
MAX 
     
0.005 0.010 0.011 0.011 
      
[0.299] [0.567] [0.643] [0.641] 
O-A 
     
0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 
      
[2.169] [2.196] [2.013] [2.361] 
ln(DISP) 
     
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
      
[-6.107] [-6.360] [-6.283] [-7.471] 
KZ index 
     
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
      
[-1.114] [-1.088] [-1.241] [-0.934] 
PPE-A 
     
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
      
[0.574] [0.626] [0.817] [0.629] 
Z-score 
     
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
      
[-1.398] [-1.090] [-1.275] [-1.835] 
βMKT 
      
0.003* 0.002 0.002 
       
[1.771] [1.435] [1.573] 
βSMB 
      
0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
[0.671] [0.631] [0.623] 
βHML 
      
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
       
[0.131] [-0.109] [-0.419] 
βUMD 
      
-0.001 
  
       
[-0.622] 
  βRMW 
       
0.001 0.001 





       
0.001 0.001 
        
[0.995] [0.711] 
Intercept 0.005** 0.008** 0.006** 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.010 -0.016* -0.012 -0.019** 
 
[2.017] [2.329] [2.392] [2.925] [2.960] [-1.001] [-1.738] [-1.224] [-2.068] 
Industry FE 
        
Yes 
Average R2 0.011 0.005 0.014 0.033 0.038 0.121 0.139 0.139 0.209 























Investor Sentiment and the R&D Anomaly 
 
This table reports the results of our analysis of size-adjusted R&D quintile portfolios conditional on investor sentiment states. Sentiment state is 
defined as high (low) if the beginning-of-period value of the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index is higher (lower) than the sample median. 
We divide the R&D stocks independently into 2×5 size and RD-MV portfolios and calculate the equal and value-weighted average monthly 
portfolio returns within each state. We adjust for the size effect by equal averaging the average returns of the two size portfolios within each R&D 
rank. Panel A reports the portfolio average excess returns of the quintile and zero-cost spread (Portfolio 5-1) portfolios. Panels B and C report the 
estimated alpha from the C-4 and FF-5 models.  
 





Portfolio Sentiment 1 (L) 2 3 4 5 (H) 5-1   1 (L) 2 3 4 5 (H) 5-1 
RET High -0.32% 0.00% 0.25% 0.51% 0.93% 1.25% 
 
-0.26% -0.10% 0.18% 0.31% 0.51% 0.78% 
t-stat 
 
[-0.646] [0.005] [0.499] [0.927] [1.489] [4.637] 
 
[-0.663] [-0.240] [0.425] [0.658] [1.001] [3.089] 
RET Low 1.08% 1.42% 1.71% 2.00% 2.38% 1.29% 
 
0.94% 1.12% 1.26% 1.59% 1.76% 0.82% 
t-stat 
 
[3.027] [3.783] [4.212] [4.394] [4.317] [4.208] 
 
[3.010] [3.226] [3.376] [3.820] [3.388] [2.538] 
RET H-L -1.40% -1.42% -1.46% -1.49% -1.44% -0.04% 
 
-1.20% -1.22% -1.08% -1.27% -1.25% -0.05% 
p-value 
 
0.027 0.031 0.031 0.046 0.096 0.914 
 
0.017 0.024 0.055 0.044 0.087 0.912 
               
Panel B. C-4 Alpha 
Portfolio Sentiment 1 (L) 2 3 4 5 (H) 5-1 
 
1 (L) 2 3 4 5 (H) 5-1 
α High -0.30% 0.03% 0.23% 0.55% 0.99% 1.29% 
 
-0.44% -0.28% 0.01% 0.18% 0.30% 0.74% 
t-stat 
 
[-1.504] [0.134] [1.511] [2.683] [3.237] [4.374] 
 
[-3.422] [-2.153] [0.110] [1.107] [1.355] [2.785] 
α Low -0.04% 0.22% 0.49% 0.57% 0.75% 0.80% 
 
-0.16% 0.00% 0.10% 0.22% 0.13% 0.29% 
t-stat 
 
[-0.338] [2.011] [3.929] [3.480] [3.273] [3.442] 
 
[-1.426] [0.043] [0.958] [1.627] [0.601] [1.199] 
α H-L -0.26% -0.19% -0.26% -0.03% 0.23% 0.49% 
 
-0.28% -0.28% -0.09% -0.05% 0.17% 0.45% 
p-value 
 
0.375 0.532 0.286 0.945 0.461 0.186 
 
0.155 0.144 0.780 0.993 0.495 0.202 
               
Panel C. FF-5 Alpha 
Portfolio Sentiment 1 (L) 2 3 4 5 (H) 5-1 
 
1 (L) 2 3 4 5 (H) 5-1 
α High -0.08% 0.25% 0.45% 0.80% 1.23% 1.31% 
 





[-0.320] [0.935] [2.384] [3.195] [3.358] [4.385] 
 
[-2.122] [-0.737] [1.217] [2.609] [2.063] [2.820] 
α Low -0.18% 0.12% 0.40% 0.60% 0.91% 1.09% 
 
-0.01% 0.03% 0.16% 0.38% 0.40% 0.41% 
t-stat 
 
[-1.438] [1.118] [3.343] [3.926] [4.221] [5.099] 
 
[-0.073] [0.306] [1.508] [2.741] [1.976] [1.770] 
α H-L 0.10% 0.13% 0.05% 0.19% 0.32% 0.22% 
 
-0.27% -0.13% -0.03% 0.03% 0.05% 0.32% 
p-value 
 
0.580 0.538 0.658 0.402 0.379 0.550 
 
0.194 0.635 0.879 0.707 0.738 0.350 






Limits To Arbitrage and the R&D Anomaly 
 
This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences analysis that exploits the exogenous variation in limits to 
arbitrage, specifically the restriction to short selling, provided by the pilot program under Regulation SHO between June 2005 
and July 2007. The sample includes all of our R&D stocks that are constituents of the Russell 3000 index. Panel A compares 
the average firm characteristics of the pilot and non-pilot R&D stocks at the end of 2003 (prior to the announcement of 
Regulation SHO). We also report the mean firm characteristics for both pilot and non-pilot R&D stocks that are in the long 
and short legs, respectively. The difference-in-means test results are reported for the full Russell R&D sample, and the long 
and short legs. Panels B and C report the difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of reducing the short-sale restriction 
on the equal and value-weighted average returns of the high (long), low (short) and high-minus-low (long-minus-short spread) 
R&D quintile portfolios, respectively. The R&D quintile portfolios are formed using the full-sample breakpoints as in Table 
1. We report results based on excess returns, and risk-adjusted returns by the C-4 and FF-5 models (computed by adding the 
estimated intercepts to the C-4 and FF-5 regression residuals). Pilot is a treatment dummy equal to one for pilot stocks under 
Regulation SHO, and zero otherwise. During is a dummy that equals one for the period June 2005 to July 2007 and zero 
otherwise. Post is a dummy equal to one after July 2007 and zero otherwise. T-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics (Mean values at 2003m12) 
 






Treatment minus Control 
  Full Short Long   Full Short Long   Full Short Long 
RD-MV 0.086 0.012 0.364 
 
0.107 0.011 0.447 
 
-0.021** 0.000 -0.082 
Ln(ME) 6.684 7.327 5.610 
 
6.613 7.307 5.499 
 
0.071 0.020 0.112 
Ln(BM) -0.802 -1.113 -0.407 
 
-0.710 -0.926 -0.109 
 
-0.092* -0.186* -0.297** 
RET(2,12) 0.697 0.484 1.403 
 
0.690 0.352 1.778 
 
0.007 0.132 -0.376 
OP 0.163 0.523 -0.519 
 
0.091 0.310 -0.430 
 
0.073 0.214 -0.089 
Inv 0.074 0.211 -0.236 
 
0.071 0.207 -0.163 
 
0.003 0.005 -0.073 
REV 0.045 0.050 0.022 
 
0.039 0.041 0.057 
 
0.006 0.008 -0.035 
Ln(TURN) 0.542 0.227 0.797 
 
0.576 0.260 0.928 
 
-0.034 -0.034 -0.131 
ILLIQ 0.002 0.003 0.004 
 
0.003 0.002 0.004 
 
0.000 0.001 0.000 
LIQU 0.012 0.005 0.033 
 
0.011 0.001 0.045 
 
0.001 0.004 -0.012 
Ln(IVol) -4.041 -4.331 -3.529 
 
-4.049 -4.352 -3.601 
 
0.008 0.021 0.072 
MAX 0.059 0.044 0.082 
 
0.061 0.045 0.091 
 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.009 
O-A 1.041 0.900 1.359 
 
1.145 0.929 1.297 
 
-0.104 -0.029 0.061 
Ln(Disp) -6.040 -7.129 -3.981 
 
-5.952 -6.891 -3.850 
 
-0.088 -0.238 -0.131 
KZ index -4.838 -4.193 -5.169 
 
-5.078 -4.009 -3.903 
 
0.240 -0.183 -1.266 
PPE-A 0.182 0.211 0.147 
 
0.189 0.268 0.155 
 
-0.007 -0.057*** -0.008 
Z-score 22.699 20.890 14.850   22.586 19.682 16.494   0.113 1.208 -1.644 




C-4 adjusted returns 
 
FF-5 adjusted returns 
 
Long Short Long-Short 
 
Long Short Long-Short 
 
Long Short Long-Short 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Pilot×During 0.0019 -0.0005 0.0024 
 
0.0024 -0.0006 0.0030 
 
0.0017 -0.0005 0.0021 
 
(0.3160) (-0.2377) (0.3960) 
 
(0.4122) (-0.2994) (0.5160) 
 
(0.2848) (-0.2172) (0.3598) 
Pilot×Post -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0006 
 
-0.0003 0.0002 -0.0005 
 
-0.0014 0.0001 -0.0015 
 
(-0.0848) (0.0487) (-0.0937) 
 
(-0.0536) (0.0834) (-0.0790) 
 
(-0.2697) (0.0479) (-0.2600) 
Pilot 0.0020 0.0010 0.0010 
 
0.0022 0.0008 0.0015 
 




(0.7666) (0.7579) (0.3508) 
 
(0.8745) (0.6234) (0.5017) 
 
(1.3805) (0.2247) (1.1282) 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 912 912 912 
 
912 912 912 
 
912 912 912 
R2 0.9450 0.9696 0.8536   0.7925 0.7107 0.7911   0.7692 0.7524 0.7656 
 




C-4 adjusted returns 
 
FF-5 adjusted returns 
 
Long Short Long-Short 
 
Long Short Long-Short 
 
Long Short Long-Short 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Pilot×During 0.0062 -0.0011 0.0074 
 
0.0061 -0.0007 0.0068 
 
0.0061 -0.0007 0.0068 
 
(0.6799) (-0.3426) (0.8433) 
 
(0.7250) (-0.2298) (0.8048) 
 
(0.7333) (-0.2245) (0.8008) 
Pilot×Post -0.0174** 0.0012 -0.0186** 
 
-0.0209*** 0.0012 -0.0221*** 
 
-0.0208*** 0.0010 -0.0218*** 
 
(-2.4485) (0.3674) (-2.4148) 
 
(-3.0514) (0.3893) (-2.9144) 
 
(-3.0168) (0.3143) (-2.8594) 
Pilot 0.0083** -0.0008 0.0091** 
 
0.0094*** -0.0017 0.0111*** 
 
0.0096*** -0.0015 0.0111*** 
 
(2.1119) (-0.4363) (2.1175) 
 
(2.7332) (-0.8995) (2.8029) 
 
(2.7895) (-0.7955) (2.8027) 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 912 912 912 
 
912 912 912 
 
912 912 912 












Detailed Variable Definitions 
 
Accounting variables are from Compustat with fiscal year end in calendar year t-1 are matched with monthly CRSP returns from July of year t 
to June of year t+1. 
 
Variable Definition Source 
RD-MV Total R&D expenditure in fiscal year ending in year t-1 divided by total market capitalization 
as at the end of December year t-1.  
 
Compustat and CRSP 
ln(BM) Log of the book-to-market equity ratio. Following Fama and French (1993), book equity is 
total assets for year t-1, minus liabilities, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit if available, minus preferred stock liquidating value if available, or redemption 
value if available, or carrying value. Market equity is shares outstanding at the end of 
December of year t-1 times share price. 
Compustat and CRSP 
ln(ME) Log of the market capitalization (shares outstanding times share price) at the end of June of 
year t. 
CRSP 
RET(-12,-2) Momentum is calculated as the cumulated compounded stock return from month j-12 to 
month j-2, which is updated monthly. 
 
CRSP 
OP Operating profitability, computed as revenue minus costs of goods sold, minus selling, 
general and administrative expenses, minus interest expenses, all divided by book equity. 
Compustat 
INV Investment, computed as the change in total assets from fiscal year ending in year t-2 to the 
fiscal year ending in year t-1, divided by t-2 total assets. 
Compustat 
REV Short-term reversal is the stock return in the previous month following Jegadeesh (1990).  CRSP 
ln(TURN) Following Chordia et al. (2001), a stock’s turnover ratio is share trading volume divided by 
the number of shares outstanding. We use the log turnover ratio of month j-2 to explain 





ILLIQ Following Amihud (2002), a stock’s market illiquidity in month j is measured as the average 




where Ri,d and VOLDi,d are the daily return and trading volume of stock i on day d in month j. 
Following Gao and Ritter (2010), institutional features are taken into account by dividing the 
NASDAQ volume by 2.0, 1.8, 1.6 and 1 for the periods prior to Feb 2001, between Feb 2001 
and Dec 2001, between January 2002 and Dec 2003 and Jan 2004 and later years, 
respectively. Similar to Bali et al. (2014), we require a stock to have at least 15 daily return 




LIQU Following Bali et al. (2014), a stock’s illiquidity shock is computed as: 
LIQUi,j = ILLIQi,j  – AVGILLIQi,j−12,j−1 
where ILLIQi,t is the monthly stock illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) of stock i in month 
j and AVGILLIQi,j-12,j-1 is the mean ILLIQi,t over the past 12 months (from month j-12 to j-1). 
CRSP 
ln(IVOL) Following Ang et al. (2006), a stock’s monthly idiosyncratic volatility (IVol) is defined as the 
log of one plus the standard deviation of residuals from the Fama and French (1993) three 
factor model, estimated using daily returns within that month. We require a stock to have at 
least 15 daily stock return observations for the estimation. 
CRSP 
MAX The maximum daily return in the previous month following Bali et al. (2011).  CRSP 
54 
 
O-A The intensity of organization capital, computed as the ratio of the stock of organization 
capital to total assets. The stock of organization capital is computed as the capitalized SG&A 
expenses based on the perpetual inventory method. Specifically, a firm’s stock of 
organization capital (OC) is computed by recursively cumulating its deflated value of SG&A 
expenses as follows: 
 
OCi,t = (1 - δo) · Oi,t-1 + (SG&Ait / cpit), 
 
where δo is the depreciation rate and cpit is the US consumer price index. For each firm, we 
start the recursive estimation of its stock of organizational capital since its first observation in 
the Compustat database. Following prior studies, we treat missing observations of the SG&A 
expenses as zero. The initial stock of organization capital is defined as: 
 
OC0 = SG&A1 / (g + δo). 
 
Following prior studies (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013), a depreciation rate of 15% is 
used. The growth rate g is assumed to be 10%. 
Compustat 
ln(DISP) Analyst forecast dispersion is the log of the cross-sectional standard deviation of analysts’ 
one-year ahead earning per share forecasts. Following Zhang (2006), we calculate the time 
series of monthly standard deviations in each fiscal year as analysts update their forecasts 
and then average these to obtain a measure for each firm’s fiscal year. To reduce the problem 





KZ index Financial constraint index, computed according to Kaplan and Zingales (1997) as follows: 
 
KZ Index = -1.002×(Cash flow) + 0.283×(Tobin’s Q) + 3.139×(Leverage) - 
39.368×(Dividends) - 1.315×(Cash holdings), 
 
where Cash flow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and 
amortization, divided by total net property, plant & equipment. Tobin's Q is computed as 
((book value of assets + market equity (at fiscal year end))-book equity-Deferred 
Taxes)/book value of assets). Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities, divided by the sum of long-term debt, debt in current liabilities and total 
stockholders' equity. Dividend is the sum of common and preferred dividends, divided by 
total net property, plant & equipment. Cash holdings are the cash and short-term investments 
to total net property, plant & equipment. The total net property, plant & equipment used in 
computing this KZ index is lagged by one year. 
 
Compustat and CRSP 






Z-score The Altman (1968) Z-score measure for bankruptcy prediction. Following Altman (1968), 
we estimate the Z-score as: 
 
Z-score = 1.2×(WC/TA) + 1.4×(RE/TA) + 3.3×(EBIT/TA) + 0.6×(MVEQ/DEBT) +      
0.999×(SALE/TA), 
 
where WC, TA, RE, EBIT, MVEQ, DEBT and SALE are working capital, total assets, earnings 
before interest and taxes, market equity value, book value of debts and total sales. For easier 
interpretation of our regression coefficient we divide the Z-score by 1000. 
 
Compustat 
Pilot A treatment dummy variable equal one when a R&D stock is designated as a pilot stock 
under Regulation SHO, and zero otherwise. 
Fang et al. (2016), SEC 
(2004) 
During A dummy variable equal one between June 2005 and July 2007, and zero otherwise. SEC (2004) 
Post A dummy variable equal one after July 2007, and zero otherwise. SEC (2004) 
 
